Why Filipinos Support Underperforming Politicians?

by Alan S. Cajes

Persistent electoral support for underperforming politicians in the Philippines reveals a web of sociocultural dynamics that extend beyond governance metrics. Rather than a simple failure of voter judgment, this phenomenon reflects deeply rooted historical patterns, cultural norms, and pragmatic decision-making shaped by structural constraints.

The Power of Personalism

At the heart of Filipino political culture is personalism—the privileging of personal relationships over impersonal systems. In this context, voters often evaluate politicians not on the basis of institutional performance but on the strength of personal interaction. Politicians who are highly visible in community events—attending funerals, weddings, and baptisms—or who provide immediate aid during crises, cultivate bonds that are emotional, reciprocal, and durable.

These interactions generate a powerful sense of utang na loob (debt of gratitude), which can outweigh abstract indicators such as poverty rates or audit reports. The relational nature of Filipino society thus incentivizes politicians to invest in personal visibility and patronage rather than long-term institutional reforms.

Family Politics and Dynastic Loyalty

The Philippine political system is heavily shaped by dynasties, with over 70% of legislators coming from political families. These dynasties often function as quasi-institutions, fostering enduring relationships with communities that span generations. Political allegiance, in many cases, becomes hereditary—voters support familiar names not necessarily because of proven competence, but because of long-standing bonds and a sense of communal belonging.

This dynastic continuity transforms political support into a surrogate of familial loyalty, where casting a vote feels like affirming one’s own kin rather than selecting the most qualified candidate.

Pragmatic Adaptation in a Flawed System

Many voters face a limited spectrum of viable choices, often constrained by weak party systems, the high cost of political entry, and the marginalization of reform-oriented candidates. In such an environment, political support may be less about ideological alignment or governance records and more about strategic survival. Voters rationally gravitate toward politicians who offer concrete, if uneven, benefits—jobs, financial aid, access to medical care—even if these come at the expense of broader reforms.

Far from being irrational, this behavior reflects a pragmatic calculus: when systemic change appears out of reach, voters prioritize the politician who provides for their immediate needs.

Visibility of Tangible Goods vs. Invisible Reforms

In communities grappling with poverty and daily insecurity, the most visible acts of governance—such as constructing basketball courts, distributing cash aid, or organizing medical missions—carry disproportionate weight. These acts offer instant, recognizable returns, while infrastructure reform, anti-corruption measures, or improved procurement processes often remain invisible or unintelligible to the average citizen.

The result is a skewed valuation system where performative politics eclipses substantive governance, reinforcing cycles of short-termism and dependency.

Historical Legacy and Political Expectations

The Philippines’ colonial past left behind governance systems that prioritized control and resource extraction over participatory governance and equitable service delivery. This legacy conditioned citizens to rely on personal intermediaries—such as local officials or political patrons—to access basic services, embedding a clientelist mindset in political life.

Rather than viewing the State as a rights-based provider, many Filipinos continue to see it as something navigated through relationships, obligations, and favors.

Pathways to Reform

Addressing this phenomenon requires interventions on both the supply and demand sides of politics. On the supply side, it means creating conditions for new, competent, and reform-minded leaders to emerge, supported by campaign finance reform, stronger party systems, and accountability mechanisms. On the demand side, it involves fostering a civic culture where performance and integrity matter more than patronage.

Civic education must be expanded and deepened to help citizens connect the abstract language of governance to the concrete realities of their lives. Transparent information ecosystems must be built to track and communicate political performance clearly and accessibly.

Rationality in Context

Filipino support for underperforming politicians should not be simplistically dismissed as irrational. Rather, it reflects an adaptive response to a political culture shaped by historical legacies, institutional weaknesses, and socioeconomic realities. Until these underlying conditions shift, personal loyalty and immediate gain will continue to trump governance metrics.

Meaningful reform, then, depends not only on changing who gets elected, but on transforming the very structures and norms that define how politics is understood and practiced in everyday life.

References for Further Reading

Abinales, P. N., & Amoroso, D. J. (2017). *State and Society in the Philippines* (2nd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield.

Casiple, R. C. (2016). "The Party-List System: Opportunities and Challenges for Democratic Expansion." In *Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy* (2nd ed.). Commission on Human Rights.

Coronel, S. S., Chua, Y. T., Rimban, L., & Cruz, B. B. (2007). *The Rulemakers: How the Wealthy and Well-Born Dominate Congress*. Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism.

Hedman, E. L. E. (2010). "The Politics of 'Public Opinion' in the Philippines." *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 29(4), 97-118.

Hutchcroft, P. D. (2000). "Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the American Philippines, 1900-1913." *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 59(2), 277-306.

Kerkvliet, B. J. (2013). *Everyday Politics in the Philippines: Class and Status Relations in a Central Luzon Village*. Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Lande, C. H. (1996). *Post-Marcos Politics: A Geographical and Statistical Analysis of the 1992 Presidential Election*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

McCoy, A. W. (Ed.). (2009). *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines*. University of Wisconsin Press.

Mendoza, R. U., Beja Jr, E. L., Venida, V. S., & Yap, D. B. (2016). "Political Dynasties and Poverty: Evidence from the Philippines." *Asian Economic Papers*, 15(3), 63-98.

Querubin, P. (2016). "Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 11(2), 151-181.

Sidel, J. T. (1999). *Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines*. Stanford University Press.

Teehankee, J. C. (2018). "House of Clans: Political Dynasties in the Legislature." In *Philippine Politics: Possibilities and Problems in a Localist Democracy* (pp. 45-73). Routledge.