The Solar Philippines Case and the Governance of Renewable Energy Development

 by Alan S. Cajes, PhD

The trajectory of the companies associated with Solar Philippines offers an instructive case in the political economy of renewable-energy development in the Philippines. It demonstrates that in a capital-intensive and heavily regulated electricity market, substantial enterprise value can be created long before a project produces its first kilowatt-hour. Land control, renewable-energy service contracts, permits, access to transmission infrastructure, offtake arrangements, and regulatory positioning can themselves become valuable development assets. Yet the same model raises an important public-policy question: how should the State encourage entrepreneurial project development without allowing scarce energy rights to become speculative assets detached for too long from actual generating capacity?

The Solar Philippines experience is therefore best understood neither simply as a story of entrepreneurial success nor as a case of regulatory failure. It is a case of institutional specialization and its limits. Early-stage developers perform functions that large utilities and infrastructure companies do not always perform efficiently: identifying sites, assembling fragmented landholdings, obtaining permits, securing contracts, developing project concepts, and assuming the uncertainty associated with projects that may never reach construction. Large infrastructure companies, in turn, possess capabilities that entrepreneurial developers often lack: deep balance sheets, access to long-term financing, construction-management systems, institutional credibility, and the capacity to absorb the risks of multi-billion-peso projects. The evolution of Solar Philippines and SP New Energy Corporation, or SPNEC, illustrates the movement from the first set of capabilities to the second.

Development Rights as Strategic Assets

Solar Philippines recognized relatively early that the principal constraints on utility-scale solar development were not necessarily the availability of photovoltaic technology. Solar panels were becoming cheaper and increasingly standardized. The more difficult resources were suitable land, access to transmission facilities, regulatory approvals, project development rights, and eventually bankable power-purchase arrangements.

The resulting strategy placed considerable emphasis on securing large tracts of land and building a portfolio of renewable-energy projects. This was economically rational. A solar project located far from adequate transmission infrastructure may be commercially unattractive regardless of the price of solar modules. Conversely, control over contiguous land near existing or planned transmission corridors can create considerable development value even before construction begins.

This strategy, however, also reveals a regulatory dilemma. Renewable-energy service contracts are not ordinary private assets. They derive their value partly from authority granted by the State and are intended ultimately to contribute to national energy objectives. Accumulating development rights can reduce transaction costs and accelerate project preparation when these rights are converted into operating capacity. But when developers hold large portfolios without achieving agreed milestones, those rights may impose opportunity costs on the energy system.

The policy issue is therefore not land aggregation or project accumulation per se. The relevant question is whether development rights remain connected to credible schedules for financing, permitting, construction, and commercial operation.

This distinction became particularly important following the Department of Energy's termination or relinquishment of a substantial number of renewable-energy service contracts associated with Solar Philippines. The episode suggests that the appropriate regulatory response to project aggregation is not necessarily to prohibit developers from building large pipelines. Rather, the State must enforce credible milestones, performance obligations, financial commitments, and relinquishment provisions so that development rights circulate toward firms capable of converting them into actual capacity.

A renewable-energy service contract should facilitate development. It should not become an indefinite option on future electricity markets.

Solar Para sa Bayan and the Limits of Legislative Authorization

The experience of Solar Para sa Bayan Corporation, or SPSB, presents a different but related governance issue. Republic Act No. 11357 granted the company a 25-year non-exclusive congressional franchise to construct, install, establish, operate, and maintain distributed energy resources and microgrid systems in specified areas.

The franchise was innovative in intent. It sought to address persistent electrification problems, particularly in underserved and unserved communities where conventional distribution and generation arrangements had not always produced reliable and affordable electricity. It represented an entrepreneurial attempt to use decentralized energy systems to address weaknesses in traditional rural electrification.

But the episode also illustrates a fundamental principle of Philippine energy governance: a legislative franchise is an authorization to participate in a regulated industry; it is not a substitute for regulation.

RA 11357 itself subjected SPSB to the regulatory authority of the Energy Regulatory Commission, the Department of Energy, and other relevant agencies. Rates remained subject to ERC approval. Technical and operating requirements remained applicable. Subsequent regulatory proceedings concerning alleged operation without required authorizations and the collection of rates without appropriate regulatory approval underscore the distinction between possessing a congressional franchise and possessing all the regulatory permissions necessary to provide electricity legally.

The controversy surrounding the franchise also raised questions of political ethics because Leandro Leviste of Solar Philippines is the son of then-Senator Loren Legarda. Such circumstances understandably generated public concern over possible conflicts of interest. But governance analysis requires precision. Potential or perceived conflict should not automatically be treated as evidence of improper intervention. Legarda abstained from the Senate vote and publicly stated that she did not participate in deliberations concerning the franchise.

This distinction is important. Public ethics must address not only actual corruption, but also circumstances that can weaken confidence in public institutions. At the same time, allegations of influence should not be converted into findings without evidence. The appropriate institutional response is therefore stronger transparency, mandatory disclosure, recusal rules, and documentary traceability of legislative and regulatory decisions.

The later enactment of the Microgrid Systems Act further institutionalized competitive selection for microgrid service providers. This did not remove an exclusive territorial privilege from SPSB, because its franchise was already expressly non-exclusive. Rather, it established a more general policy architecture under which microgrid service would be awarded through competitive processes rather than depend principally on firm-specific legislative authorization.

The broader lesson is significant. Innovation in public utilities cannot depend on legislative franchises alone. Sustainable market entry requires alignment among statutory authority, sector regulation, competition policy, technical compliance, and commercial viability.

SPNEC and the Transition from Origination to Execution

The listing of SP New Energy Corporation on the Philippine Stock Exchange in December 2021 marked a different stage in the evolution of the Solar Philippines business model. SPNEC provided access to public capital and later became a vehicle for consolidating a larger portfolio of Solar Philippines projects.

The strategy eventually centered on what became the MTerra Solar Project, a utility-scale development combining approximately 3,500 MWp of solar generation with 4,500 MWh of battery-energy storage. Its scale placed it in a category fundamentally different from conventional solar developments.

At this level, project-development skill alone is insufficient.

Land must be converted and assembled. Transmission infrastructure must be constructed. Engineering, procurement, and construction risks must be managed. Battery systems must be integrated. Contractors must be coordinated. Long-term financing must be arranged. Offtake obligations must be made bankable. Billions of pesos must be committed years before revenue becomes certain.

This is where the distinction between project origination and infrastructure execution becomes decisive.

Solar Philippines demonstrated considerable capability in identifying opportunities, assembling projects, securing land, and creating development value. But a project approaching ₱200 billion requires an institutional balance sheet far beyond that normally available to an entrepreneurial developer.

The entry of Meralco PowerGen's renewable-energy subsidiary into SPNEC therefore represented more than a conventional acquisition. MGEN's investment gave it controlling voting interest in SPNEC and progressively shifted the project from an entrepreneur-led development platform toward an institutionally financed infrastructure undertaking.

The subsequent ₱150-billion syndicated financing for MTerra Solar illustrates the significance of this transition. It would be excessive to claim that MGEN's participation alone caused the financing to become possible. Financing depends on multiple factors, including project economics, contractual structures, lender assessment, collateral, engineering arrangements, and expected cash flows. Nevertheless, the participation of a large infrastructure group with a stronger balance sheet substantially strengthened the project's institutional and financial platform.

This evolution illustrates an important characteristic of infrastructure markets. The firm that originates a project does not necessarily have to be the firm that ultimately constructs and operates it.

Entrepreneurs may specialize in discovery and development. Large infrastructure companies may specialize in financing and execution. Properly governed, transactions between them can transfer projects toward institutions best able to deliver them.

Divestment, Public Office, and Political Ethics

Leviste's election to the House of Representatives in 2025 introduced another governance dimension. Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution restricts members of Congress from holding direct or indirect financial interests in government contracts, franchises, or special privileges during their term.

His subsequent disposals of substantial SPNEC shareholdings occurred against this constitutional background and should be understood as a progressive divestment and transfer of corporate control rather than as a single, clean corporate exit.

Care is necessary in describing the motivation for each transaction. The existence of constitutional restrictions creates a compelling reason to eliminate financial interests that could generate actual or perceived conflicts. But unless a particular divestment was expressly undertaken pursuant to a legal order or formal determination, it is more accurate to say that the transactions occurred in the context of those constitutional restrictions than to declare that every sale was legally compelled by them.

This distinction matters because public ethics should be governed by rules rather than inference.

The larger issue is the institutional relationship between entrepreneurship and public office. Business success does not disqualify a person from public service. But entry into public office changes the applicable ethical standard. Assets, government contracts, franchises, regulatory relationships, and beneficial interests that may have been legitimate in private life can create conflicts once political authority is acquired.

The appropriate safeguard is therefore not hostility toward private enterprise. It is clear separation between private financial interests and public decision-making.

MTerra and the Conversion of Development Rights into Infrastructure

The commencement of commercial operations of MTerra Solar's first phase in 2026 provides an important counterpoint to concerns about undeveloped project rights. The project demonstrates what ultimately matters in energy policy: not the number of service contracts announced, hectares assembled, megawatts placed in development pipelines, or corporate valuations generated, but dependable electricity delivered into the grid.

This distinction between development megawatts and operating megawatts should become more prominent in Philippine energy governance.

Project pipelines are useful indicators of future supply, but they should not be treated as equivalent to committed capacity. Energy planning should differentiate projects according to maturity: conceptual, contracted, permitted, financed, under construction, mechanically completed, interconnected, and commercially operational.

Such differentiation is especially important when assessing whether the Philippines has sufficient future generation capacity to meet electricity demand and renewable-energy targets.

MTerra also demonstrates why energy storage is becoming integral to large renewable developments. Solar generation is inherently variable. Pairing utility-scale solar with battery-energy storage allows renewable electricity to be shifted across time, provides greater operational flexibility, and improves the ability of renewable projects to supply energy during periods that do not coincide precisely with peak solar production.

Thus, MTerra is not simply a very large solar farm. It represents a transition toward integrated renewable-energy infrastructure combining generation, storage, transmission, financing, and long-term electricity supply arrangements.

Consolidation and the Competition Question

The transfer of control of SPNEC to MGEN also raises a larger structural issue for Philippine electricity policy.

There are strong economic reasons for consolidation. Large infrastructure projects benefit from scale, financial strength, technical capability, procurement power, and sophisticated risk-management systems. These attributes can accelerate construction and reduce the probability that major projects will remain stranded in development.

But concentration also carries governance risks.

Meralco operates the country's largest electricity distribution franchise, while companies within the same broader corporate group participate in electricity generation. Such vertical affiliations are not inherently unlawful, and they may produce genuine efficiencies. Yet they require continuing regulatory scrutiny because generation and distribution relationships can affect power procurement, market access, pricing, competition, and the bargaining position of independent generators.

The appropriate policy question is therefore not whether vertical integration should automatically be prohibited. The better question is whether the regulatory system can capture the efficiencies of integration while preventing market power from being used against consumers or competitors.

This requires transparent competitive selection of power supply, rigorous rate review, effective monitoring of related-party transactions, enforcement of generation-concentration safeguards, open transmission access, and regulatory institutions sufficiently independent to examine transactions involving politically and economically powerful firms.

Vertical affiliation can improve bankability and execution. It simultaneously increases the importance of regulatory independence.

Toward a Better Governance Model for Renewable-Energy Development

The Solar Philippines experience suggests several directions for energy policy.

First, renewable-energy service contracts should be treated as development privileges carrying measurable obligations. Milestones for land acquisition, permitting, financing, interconnection, construction, and commercial operation should be clear and enforceable. Developers that fail repeatedly to meet them should relinquish rights so that alternative investors can develop the resources.

Second, government should distinguish legitimate project aggregation from speculative hoarding. Large portfolios are not inherently undesirable. Indeed, aggregating projects can produce efficiencies and create a pipeline attractive to institutional investors. The governance test should be performance rather than size alone.

Third, the State should strengthen transparency over project ownership and beneficial interests. Renewable-energy projects frequently move among parent companies, subsidiaries, special-purpose vehicles, listed corporations, and joint ventures. Regulatory accountability becomes difficult when the legal entity holding a service contract is different from the entity raising capital, acquiring land, signing an offtake agreement, or ultimately operating the facility.

Fourth, transmission planning should be integrated more closely with renewable-project development. Land near transmission infrastructure carries exceptional strategic value precisely because grid access remains one of the principal constraints on renewable-energy expansion. Grid connection therefore cannot remain merely a project-level concern. It is a national infrastructure-planning issue.

Fifth, political ethics rules need to keep pace with the increasingly complex structure of infrastructure ownership. Formal share ownership captures only part of potential economic interest. Effective conflict-of-interest systems must address beneficial ownership, indirect holdings, controlled entities, contractual interests, and related parties.

Finally, energy regulators should evaluate success according to commissioned and reliable capacity rather than announced project pipelines alone.

A Case of Entrepreneurship and Institutional Constraint

The Leviste–Solar Philippines story resists simple characterization.

There was genuine entrepreneurship. Large renewable-energy opportunities were identified at a time when the Philippine energy system remained heavily dependent on conventional generation. Land was assembled. Projects were originated. Capital markets were used creatively. Solar development was pushed toward a scale that would have appeared highly ambitious only a decade earlier.

There were also institutional limits.

A congressional franchise could not substitute for regulatory authorization. Development rights could not substitute indefinitely for project execution. Entrepreneurial agility could not substitute for the balance sheet needed to construct one of the world's largest integrated solar and battery projects. And private financial interests became increasingly difficult to reconcile with the obligations arising from elective public office.

The eventual transfer of control to MGEN should therefore not be interpreted simply as the defeat of an independent developer by an incumbent utility. It reflects a deeper feature of infrastructure development: different stages of a project reward different institutional capabilities.

One, the entrepreneur identifies opportunity. Two, the developer converts opportunity into project rights. Three, the financier transforms project rights into bankable assets. Four, the infrastructure company converts financing into physical capacity. Five, the regulator must ensure that each transition serves the public interest. Six, that final function is the most important.

The central policy lesson from the Solar Philippines experience is therefore not whether Leandro Leviste accumulated too much land, received too many contracts, earned too much from divestment, or ultimately sold control to a larger corporate group. Those questions may be relevant, but they are secondary. The deeper question is whether Philippine energy institutions are designed so that private actors earn value principally by delivering public value.

A well-designed renewable-energy regime should reward entrepreneurs for discovering opportunities, assembling difficult projects, assuming development risk, and attracting capital. But the same regime must prevent public franchises, renewable-energy service contracts, transmission opportunities, and other scarce regulatory rights from functioning indefinitely as tradable claims on future infrastructure without corresponding performance.

The proper balance is neither hostility to entrepreneurial accumulation nor deference to corporate scale. It is disciplined development. Project rights should carry obligations. Regulatory privileges should remain conditional on performance. Political office should require genuine separation from conflicting private interests. Market consolidation should be accompanied by stronger competition oversight. And the ultimate measure of energy policy should remain simple: not megawatts promised, accumulated, optioned, or announced, but affordable, reliable, and increasingly clean electricity actually delivered to the Filipino people.

References

Department of Energy. (2024, June 10). Department Circular No. DC2024-06-0018: Revised omnibus guidelines governing the award and administration of renewable energy contracts and the registration of renewable energy developers. https://doe.gov.ph/circular-no-dc-2024-06-0018-1

Energy Regulatory Commission. (2026, January 31). ERC to issue show cause order vs. Solar Para Sa Bayan Corp. (SPSB). https://www.erc.gov.ph/Press-Singular/84676

House of Representatives of the Philippines. (n.d.). Leviste, Leandro Legarda: District representative, Batangas, 1st District. Retrieved September 12, 2026, from https://congress.gov.ph/house-members/view/L054

Legaspi, A. (2019, May 30). Legarda says she abstained from son’s solar firm franchise out of delicadeza. GMA News Online. https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/696130/legarda-says-she-abstained-from-son-s-solar-firm-franchise-out-of-delicadeza/story/

Meralco PowerGen Corporation. (2025, April 23). MGEN unit signs largest PH financing deal. https://www.meralcopowergen.com.ph/mgen-unit-signs-largest-ph-financing-deal/

Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc. (2021, November 12). Solar Philippines Nueva Ecija Corporation: Initial public offering—Preliminary terms and conditions (Listing Notice No. LN00309-2021). PSE EDGE. https://edge.pse.com.ph/downloadHtml.do?file_id=1006952

Republic of the Philippines. (1987). Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, art. VI, §§ 12–14. Supreme Court E-Library. https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/3/353

Republic of the Philippines. (2001). Republic Act No. 9136: Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001. Lawphil Project. https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2001/ra_9136_2001.html

Republic of the Philippines. (2019). Republic Act No. 11357: An Act Granting Solar Para sa Bayan Corporation a Franchise to Construct, Install, Establish, Operate and Maintain Distributed Energy Resources and Microgrids in Remote and Unviable, or Unserved or Underserved Areas in Selected Provinces of the Philippines to Improve Access to Sustainable Energy. Lawphil Project. https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2019/ra_11357_2019.html

Republic of the Philippines. (2022). Republic Act No. 11646: Microgrid Systems Act. Lawphil Project. https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2022/ra_11646_2022.html

Senate of the Philippines, Legislative Reference Bureau. (2019). House Bill No. 8179, 17th Congress of the Republic: Solar Para sa Bayan Corporation. https://ldr.senate.gov.ph/bills/house-bill-no-8179-17th-congress-republic

SP New Energy Corporation. (2023, August 2). SPNEC secures over 4,000 hectares [SEC Form 17-C; PSE Disclosure Form 4-31]. PSE EDGE. https://edge.pse.com.ph/downloadHtml.do?file_id=1350258

SP New Energy Corporation. (2024, January 26). Change in control of issuer [SEC Form 17-C; PSE Disclosure Form 4-5]. PSE EDGE. https://edge.pse.com.ph/downloadHtml.do?file_id=1437397

SP New Energy Corporation. (2025, June 25). Clarification of news article [SEC Form 17-C; PSE Disclosure Form 4-13]. PSE EDGE. https://edge.pse.com.ph/downloadHtml.do?file_id=1779516

SP New Energy Corporation. (2025, October 28). Transfer of common shares of the company pursuant to obligations under exchangeable note facility agreements executed between MGen Renewable Energy, Inc. and Solar Philippines Power Project Holdings, Inc. [PSE Disclosure Form 10-1]. PSE EDGE. https://edge.pse.com.ph/downloadHtml.do?file_id=1828978

SP New Energy Corporation. (2026, September 3). MTerra Solar Phase 1 begins commercial operations [SEC Form 17-C; PSE Disclosure Form 4-31]. PSE EDGE. https://edge.pse.com.ph/downloadHtml.do?file_id=1964177

Talavera, S. J. (2026, January 14). Solar Philippines faces P24-B penalties over terminated RE contracts. BusinessWorld Online. https://www.bworldonline.com/top-stories/2026/01/14/723984/solar-philippines-faces-p24-b-penalties-over-terminated-re-contracts/

Link to Humanities Commons

Questions and Answers on Impeachment

by Alan S. Cajes, PhD

As my political science professors at Divine Word College of Tagbilaran (now Holy Name University) and UST Graduate School used to say, ignorantia legis neminem excusat—ignorance of the law excuses no one. To deepen my own understanding, I followed discussions by the Friends of the Impeachment Court, researched available online resources, and compiled this Q&A on Impeachment for my own education.

1. What is impeachment, and does impeachment itself remove an official from office?

No. The 1987 Constitution distinguishes impeachment, which is the constitutional accusation and commencement of the removal process, from conviction, which is the predicate for removal.

Article XI distributes the impeachment power between the two Houses of Congress. The House of Representatives has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. The Senate has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. An impeached official therefore remains in office unless and until the constitutionally required Senate judgment results in conviction.

Article XI, Section 3(7) further limits the judgment in an impeachment case: it “shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines.” A convicted officer nevertheless remains subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment under ordinary law. Impeachment liability and criminal liability are therefore constitutionally distinct.

2. Who may be impeached, and on what constitutional grounds?

Article XI, Section 2 identifies an exclusive class of impeachable officers: the President; the Vice-President; the Members of the Supreme Court; the Members of the Constitutional Commissions; and the Ombudsman. They may be removed upon impeachment and conviction for: culpable violation of the Constitution; treason; bribery; graft and corruption; other high crimes; or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Impeachment is therefore an exceptional constitutional mode of removal confined to the officers expressly enumerated in Article XI.

3. How may an impeachment case be initiated in the House of Representatives?

Article XI, Section 3 establishes more than one procedural route. Under the ordinary route, a verified complaint may be filed by a Member of the House or by a citizen upon endorsement by a House Member. It must be included in the Order of Business within the constitutionally prescribed period and referred to the proper House committee. The committee investigates and reports to the House, after which at least one-third of all House Members is required either to affirm a favorable resolution containing Articles of Impeachment or to override an unfavorable committee resolution.

A constitutionally distinct route exists under Section 3(4): where a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all Members of the House, that complaint or resolution itself constitutes the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate is to proceed forthwith.

4. Does the Constitution allow more than one impeachment proceeding against the same official within one year?

No. Article XI, Section 3(5) provides that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”

5. Is impeachment in the Philippines a purely political proceeding?

No. Philippine constitutional doctrine increasingly characterizes impeachment as a sui generis legal, political, and constitutional process. Its political character derives from the identity of the institutions entrusted with accusation and judgment and from the fundamentally governmental nature of the wrongs involved. Its legal character derives from constitutional text, prescribed procedures, voting thresholds, due-process guarantees, and judicially enforceable constitutional limitations. The hybrid character of impeachment is not an anomaly. It is part of its constitutional design.

6. What vote is constitutionally required to convict in the Senate?

Article XI, Section 3(6) provides: “No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.” The Senate is constitutionally composed of twenty-four Senators. Where all twenty-four offices are occupied and all twenty-four persons indisputably count as “Members of the Senate” for purposes of Section 3(6), two-thirds equals sixteen affirmative votes.

The present constitutional difficulty lies not in the arithmetic but in the denominator. The Constitution says “all the Members of the Senate,” not “two-thirds of the Members present,” as does the corresponding United States provision. Questions therefore arise when the actual institutional situation differs from an uncomplicated twenty-four-member body—for example because of a vacancy, resignation, expulsion, suspension, detention, legal incapacity, physical incapacity, or prolonged absence. Those circumstances must themselves be differentiated. A vacant office and an incumbent senator unable to participate are not necessarily the same constitutional phenomenon.

7. What are the competing interpretations of “all the Members of the Senate”?

As of September 16, 2026, the precise denominator question should be treated as a live constitutional controversy rather than settled jurisprudence. Two principal interpretive approaches have emerged.

A. Status-Based Membership Model. - Under this approach, a person who legally remains a Senator remains part of “all the Members of the Senate,” notwithstanding temporary absence, detention, illness, suspension, or practical inability to participate, unless the office itself has become vacant or membership has legally terminated. The argument rests heavily on text and constitutional structure. “All” is treated as a deliberate constraint. The supermajority requirement protects an impeachable officer from removal by a transient or reduced legislative coalition and preserves the extraordinary character of conviction. On this account, incapacity to vote is not automatically equivalent to ceasing to be a Member.

B. Functional-Capacity Model. -The competing approach interprets membership in relation to the particular constitutional function being performed. Senators who are legally incapable of exercising the impeachment power—or whose status makes participation constitutionally impossible—may, depending upon the nature of the incapacity, be excluded from the operative denominator. The argument is contextual and functional: the Constitution’s use of a fraction rather than a fixed number may permit the relevant membership base to reflect changes in the body legally capable of exercising the function.

The September 16, 2026 amicus presentations illustrate this disagreement. Former Chief Justices and a former Associate Justice advanced materially different understandings of membership, constitutional arithmetic, functional incapacity, Avelino v. Cuenco, and the purpose of the supermajority requirement. The underlying question is this: Does “membership” for Article XI, Section 3(6) turn principally upon legal status as a Senator, or upon legal capacity to exercise the constitutionally assigned impeachment function?

8. Does Avelino v. Cuenco determine the impeachment denominator?

Not directly. Avelino v. Cuenco concerned the computation of a Senate quorum in the exercise of ordinary legislative functions. It did not decide the meaning of “two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate” under Article XI, Section 3(6) of the 1987 Constitution and did not arise from an impeachment trial. Its relevance is therefore analogical rather than controlling. The case may inform analysis of whether senators beyond the chamber’s practical or coercive reach should count for particular institutional purposes. But an expert treatment must account for the differences in constitutional text, historical setting, function, and required vote. The September 2026 amici themselves recognized this limitation: Avelino was invoked as potentially persuasive or illuminating, not as a precedent mechanically disposing of the impeachment threshold.

9. Who has authority to interpret the Senate conviction threshold?

The answer requires distinguishing initial constitutional interpretation from judicial review.

Senate: Constitutionally Committed Trial and Decisional Authority

Article XI, Section 3(6) gives the Senate the “sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.” In exercising that power, the Senate necessarily interprets and applies constitutional provisions relevant to its own proceedings, including voting rules. The Senate is not an inferior court within the Supreme Court’s judicial hierarchy, and the Supreme Court does not exercise ordinary administrative or appellate supervision over the Senate Impeachment Court.

Supreme Court: Constitutional Review for Grave Abuse

Article VIII, Section 1 independently authorizes the judiciary to determine whether a branch or instrumentality of government has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court therefore may, in an appropriate case, determine whether a challenged interpretation or application of the impeachment provisions crossed an enforceable constitutional boundary. That is judicial review, not supervisory control over the Senate.

10. Must every senator-judge personally attend all proceedings or observe every witness before voting?

The Constitution does not expressly answer this question. The September 2026 amici opinions reveal competing considerations. One position emphasizes the adjudicative character of the Senate’s task: a senator-judge should meaningfully participate, examine the evidence, and discharge the oath personally rather than cast a vote detached from the trial process. A competing consideration is that adjudication does not invariably require the deciding officer personally to have observed every witness. Ordinary judges may in appropriate circumstances decide cases from transcripts and records produced before another judge, and appellate courts routinely evaluate evidence without personally receiving testimony. Thus, absence from a particular hearing does not necessarily establish constitutional incapacity to decide.

The legally relevant questions are likely more precise: Was the senator legally entitled to sit? Was the evidentiary record available? Was the senator able meaningfully to evaluate that record? Did the Senate’s own valid rules impose participation requirements? And did the procedure preserve whatever constitutional minimum of fairness applies to impeachment? The amici discussions provide important competing analyses but do not themselves settle the constitutional rule.

11. Is a Senate impeachment judgment appealable to the Supreme Court?

No ordinary appeal from the merits of a Senate impeachment judgment. But constitutional review may remain available in a proper case involving grave abuse or an enforceable constitutional boundary.

Hysteresis

by Alan S. Cajes, PhD

1. The Core Concept: What is Hysteresis? - Imagine a dry sponge sitting on a table. If you pour half a glass of water on it, the sponge stays firm, absorbs the liquid easily, and keeps the table dry. However, during a severe typhoon, if five whole buckets of water are poured onto that same sponge, it becomes fully saturated, heavy, and unable to hold more water. Water overflows onto the table.

When the rain stops and the sun comes out, pouring even half a glass of water back onto that soaked sponge will cause immediate flooding. The sponge cannot return to its dry state right away because it carries the physical "memory" of the previous storm.

This "memory" is called hysteresis—a state of path-dependency where a system’s current behavior depends heavily on its past history. Simply reversing the cause (stopping the heavy rainfall) does not immediately reverse the effect (the flooding).

2. Hysteresis in the Philippine Context. - In low-lying river basins, coastal plains, and urban corridors like Metro Manila, hysteresis manifests during prolonged monsoon rains (Habagat) and tropical cyclones:

• The Normal Baseline: Under baseline weather, natural soil infiltration and municipal drainage systems effectively route runoff toward rivers and coastal outlets.
• The Saturation Threshold: During sustained rain, soil reaches 100% moisture saturation. River channels fill to capacity, and storm sewers back up.
• Path-Dependent Environmental Lag: When rainfall drops back to light showers, flooding persists due to two main drivers:
1. Soil Moisture Retention: Saturated ground cannot absorb subsequent rainfall, no matter how light.
2. Hydrological Bottlenecks: Downstream rivers remain at peak capacity due to delayed runoff traveling down from upper mountain watersheds (such as the Sierra Madre) coupled with high-tide sea levels.

The Climate Amplification Factor. - Under climate change projections, rainfall events are becoming increasingly non-stationary—characterized by higher intensity and shorter intervals between storms. This compresses the recovery window, leaving landscapes permanently trapped in a saturated state where secondary storms trigger compound disasters.

3. The Socio-Economic Dimension: Human Hysteresis. - Systemic lag extends beyond physical hydrology into social systems. Vulnerable communities—particularly Informal Settler Families (ISFs) along waterways—experience socio-economic hysteresis:

• Prolonged physical inundation leads to secondary shocks, including waterborne disease outbreaks, permanent loss of informal livelihoods, and long-term asset depletion.
• Recovery for vulnerable households takes significantly longer than the time it took for the hazard to strike, reinforcing intergenerational poverty cycles.

4. Strategic Pathways Forward. - Addressing hysteresis requires breaking the environment's physical "memory" through integrated ecosystem-based adaptation, civil infrastructure safeguards, and statutory local planning.

A. Watershed-Level Nature-Based Solutions (Ecosystem-Based Adaptation)

• Restoring Infiltration Capacity: Expand urban green infrastructure—such as bioswales, rain gardens, and permeable pavements—to reduce initial surface runoff velocities.
• Ridge-to-Reef Governance: Establish formal inter-LGU agreements between upstream and downstream municipalities. Reforesting upper watersheds in mountain basins slows mountain runoff, smoothing out peak flood surges downstream.

B. Climate-Resilient Infrastructure and Maintenance Safeguards

• Retarding Basins and Underground Detention: Construct subsurface retention structures beneath public parks or plazas (e.g., sunken detention units) to temporarily store surge volumes for controlled release after storm peaks pass.
• Active Waterway Management with Operational Redundancy: Upgrade drainage channels with automated sluice gates and high-capacity pumps. To prevent failure during grid outages, LGUs must integrate auxiliary backup power, dedicated fuel reserves, and routine pre-monsoon desilting schedules into municipal maintenance operations.

C. Integration into Statutory Development Planning Frameworks

• Comprehensive Land Use Plans (CLUP): Enforce strict spatial zoning ordinances that protect natural wetlands, retarding basins, and floodplains from urban encroachment and illegal structures.
• Comprehensive Development Plans (CDP) and LDRRMPs: Embed soil-moisture monitoring and antecedent (prior) rainfall tracking into local Early Warning Systems (EWS). LDRRMOs must issue flood alerts based on cumulative rainfall history rather than isolated daily forecasts.
• Pre-Emptive Reservoir Management: Utilize soil-saturation sensor networks to guide the pre-emptive, controlled discharge of artificial lakes, retention ponds, and municipal reservoirs ahead of forecasted cyclones.

Recovering from an environmental disruption requires far more time and intervention than causing it. By aligning physical engineering interventions with statutory planning instruments (CLUP/CDP), social protection measures, and watershed-level governance, Philippine LGUs can effectively reduce environmental lag and build long-term disaster resilience.

Further Readings:

- Jeltsch-Thömmes, A., Battaglia, G., Cartapanis, O., Jaccard, S. L., & Joos, F. (2020). Low atmospheric $CO_2$ levels during the Little Ice Age, Eemian, and Last Interglacial generated by ocean warming and carbon impacts. *Biogeosciences*, 17(20), 5207–5233.

- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (2021). Climate change 2021: The physical science basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (V. Masson-Delmotte et al., Eds.). Cambridge University Press. [https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157896]